{news} Millstone Deactivates Security When Wind Blows: Boston Globe
David Bedell
dbedellgreen at hotmail.com
Wed Mar 1 15:21:08 EST 2006
Nancy Burton is quoted in the last paragraph. Situations like this one at
Millstone are the reason she is running for Attorney General.
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/03/01/official_at_nuclear_power_station_alleges_retaliation
The Boston Globe
Official at nuclear power station alleges retaliation
Contends he lost post after raising security concerns
By Bryan Bender, Globe Staff | March 1, 2006
WASHINGTON -- A senior official at Millstone Nuclear Power Station in
Waterford, Conn., was recently relieved of his duties after he complained
that the plant's electronic security system was seriously flawed and that
site managers had turned it off on multiple occasions to avoid false alarms,
according to a complaint to the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Sham Mehta, 58, contends he was retaliated against after repeatedly lodging
the allegations with his superiors at Dominion Nuclear Connecticut as well
as a federal inspector at the plant. Mehta -- who was removed on Jan. 31 and
is now on paid leave -- is seeking reinstatement while the NRC, state
Department of Public Utility Control, and US Department of Labor investigate
his allegations.
While Dominion refuses to talk about security matters, state investigators
last month found there were ''sufficient grounds" to believe Mehta was
punished for raising the concerns about the plant's defenses.
The allegations about inadequate security at Millstone are occurring as the
federal government is crafting new security standards for the nation's 64
nuclear power plants, and watchdog groups say the case highlights the need
for more stringent oversight. The Millstone plant, which was temporarily
shut down in 1997 by the NRC due to safety concerns, has passed all current
tests to see whether attackers could penetrate the facility. But critics
insist the tests are too easy to pass.
''They give them six months' warning that they're coming to test the
defenses," said Peter Stockton, a senior investigator at the nonpartisan
Project on Government Oversight and a former Energy Department security
official.
''Perimeter fences are a key part" of plants' defenses, he said, referring
to the type of electronic system allegedly turned off at Millstone. ''They
should be testing these systems much more aggressively."
Mehta, whose job was to field complaints from fellow plant workers, first
notified Dominion officials in late 2004 that thousands of false alarms in
the Intrusion Detection System were the result of rainy and windy weather
coming off Long Island Sound or flocks of birds -- as many as 1,000 false
alarms per day, according to the NRC report.
He also reported that the network of motion sensors and security cameras had
been purposely turned off, posing what he described as ''an unacceptable
risk" of sabotage.
He said in the NRC complaint that he had personally noted that the system
was off at one point and that workers had told him of other times when it
had been turned off by security managers.
''I discussed my . . . concern with the security manager that potential
intruders may take advantage of an unguarded area of the fence when the IDS
is not functioning," he wrote in the December complaint.
The plant tried to compensate for the lack of adequate electronic
surveillance by having guards drive around the exterior of the plant, Mehta
said.
During an investigation he performed as part of his official duties, Mehta
said in the complaint, he obtained signed statements from many security
guards reporting that they were ''desensitized" by the frequent false alarms
and sometimes declined to investigate them.
Mehta, a mechanical engineer who has worked in the nuclear industry for 30
years, further alleged that security managers altered federal reports to
contend that ''extreme weather" was responsible for the false alarms even
though they were triggered by average conditions.
State lawyers who reviewed the case concluded in a Feb. 1 internal memo that
Mehta ''did suffer an adverse employment action within a year of his
reporting his safety concerns" and that ''this establishes sufficient
grounds to establish the rebuttable presumption that Mr. Mehta was
retaliated against."
They recommended that Mehta's allegations be fully investigated and that he
be reinstated.
Dominion is opposing efforts to reinstate Mehta, contending his position has
been downsized. The plant's lawyer, David W. Bogan, argued in papers filed
to the state that ''Mr. Mehta failed to meet his burden to provide facts and
supporting evidence" that he was punished for his safety concerns, while
''Dominion provided clear and convincing evidence that its actions were
taken for reasons unconnected" to Mehta's safety complaints.
But the company declined to discuss the specific allegations, citing
security concerns.
''We have investigated every one of the allegations he has brought forward,
and we simply disagree with his findings," said Peter A. Hyde, a Millstone
spokesman. He later declined to say whether he was referring to the security
concerns or Mehta's contention that he was wrongly relieved of his duties.
The NRC's regional office near Philadelphia said it, too, cannot discuss
security-related matters, but spokesman Neil Sheehan said security
complaints are usually forwarded to the Office of Investigations. If found
to have merit, ''We could take enforcement action against the company, or we
could refer the matter to the Department of Justice for their review."
The NRC is currently drafting new rules for nuclear-plant security based on
guidelines in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The act ordered that the NRC
must take into account a dozen possible scenarios, including attacks by
multiple teams; the potential that insiders might assist terrorists; and the
possibility of water-based or airborne attacks.
But there are growing concerns that the rule-making process is not stringent
enough. Watchdog groups say current proposals assume that an attack would be
launched by fewer than half of the 19 hijackers responsible for the Sept.
11, 2001, attacks.
''Instead of looking at the actual threat, the NRC bases security standards
on what the NRC, or perhaps the nuclear industry, believes a private guard
force can be expected to handle," said Stockton.
The nuclear industry argues, however, that there are limits to private
security forces and that plants must be able to draw on local and state
police to supplement their forces in the event of an attack.
''What gets lost in the dialogue is that our facilities are protected by
private forces," said David Walters, director of security for the Nuclear
Energy Institute. He said the nation's 64 nuclear plants have increased the
number of guards by 30 percent since 2001 and invested an additional $1.2
billion in security.
''When you talk about defending against enemies of the United States, you
reach a limit of your capabilities," Walters said. ''That doesn't mean we
are not going to respond, but we may have to rely on local law enforcement,
state resources, the federal government."
Still, many are expressing concerns that the NRC is shortchanging security
standards.
Representative Edward J. Markey, a Malden Democrat who was instrumental in
passing the 2005 legislation, said the federal government must take a
stronger role in overseeing the security of nuclear plants.
''We cannot simply outsource the security of nuclear facilities to the
nuclear utility industry and its subcontractors, with little or no federal
oversight," he said in an e-mailed response to questions. ''We have learned
that without strict government guidelines, private companies do not always
act with national security as their first priority."
At a minimum, local activists are calling for a new electronic security
system at Millstone.
''The safety system is more than 35 years old," said Nancy Burton of the
Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone, a citizens action group.
''Millstone's owner has refused to spend the money required for its upkeep."
Bender can be reached at bender@ globe.com.
© Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company
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